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1. Introduction
In the Western industrialized countries, the nineteen seventies witnessed both 
a decline in productivity growth and an increase in public expenditures as a 
proportion of GNP. In a report published in the spring of 1985, the German 
Council of Economic Advisers at the Economics Ministry attributed this phe- 
nomenon to an increase in the social rate o f time preference.1 Y et while the 
inverse relation between per capita income (growth) and the rate of time prefer­
ence is well established in neoclassical growth theory, there is as yet no theorem  
relating public expenditures to time preference.
This paper is an attempt to close this gap. It presents a two sector growth 
model of a mixed economy. An im portant property of this model is the indeter- 
minancy of an optimal path towards a well-determined stationary equilibrium. 
On a more general level, this can be regarded as a stylized fact of democratic 
societies. In such societies, (almost) unanimous consent with respect to consti- 
tutional objectives can be observed. But at the same time, political debates 
demonstrate that no commonly agreed-upon ways for realizing these very 
objectives exist.
Within the analytical framework of this model, sufficient conditions are 
derived for a positive relation between the social rate of time preference and an 
appropriate measure of government activity.
The approach adopted in the model is to consider the private and the 
public sector of a mixed economy as production processes of private and 
public goods, respectively.2 The inputs into both processes are labor and
* I wish to thank Professors Joachim Klaus and Manfred Neumann as well as an 
anonymous referee for helpful comments on various earlier drafts of this paper.
1 Cf. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft [1985], Tz 9.
2 Public goods are distinguished from private goods by the well known criterion of 
joint consumability. See e.g. Blümel, Pethig and von dem Hagen [1986], p. 245.
Capital. The crucial supposition in the model is that the production of public 
goods is more labor intensive than that of private goods. This can be justified 
on two grounds. First, as is well known, the physical production of pure public 
consumption goods, such as social security, requires relatively little Capital. 
Second, and what is more relevant for the succeeding argument, the public (or 
political) process of choice which results in the physical production of public 
goods necessitates above all personal engagement; voting, bargaining, lobbying 
or participating in parliamentary decision processes are obvious examples.
Of course, this highly abstract point of view neglects most of the differences 
between political and private or market allocation which actually exist. Specifi- 
cally, by focusing on a representative individual I eliminate the problem of 
aggregating preferences and the free rider problem. One justification for this 
device may be that, in the model presented below, market failures are excluded, 
as is usually the case; thus political and market allocation are modelled under 
likewise ideal conditions. But on the other hand this procedure draws attention 
to a simple but fundamental mechanism relating public consumption to the 
social rate of time preference: in as much as time preference increases, the 
relative price of Capital rises and thus reduces the relative production costs of 
that type of goods being produced with relatively little Capital. Consequently, 
public consumption becomes more favorable.
Generally speaking, if more emphasis is put on present than on future welfare, 
political allocation appears to be more attractive than market allocation.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. In the next section 
the formal model of a mixed economy is developed. The economy’s time path 
of optimal capital accumulation is analyzed in section three. Section four covers 
the comparative-statics of the model with respect to time preference. The paper 
concludes with some conclusions and hints as to possible extensions of the 
model.
2. The Model
Consider an economy with N  identical agents and two sectors of production. 
Variables referring to the private sector are distinguished from those referring 
to the public sector by superscripts p  and g, respectively. Since it is the choice 
of a representative agent that is studied, all quantities must be regarded as per  
capita magnitudes. AU variables except total labor supply are time-dependent. 
For convenience, this is not explicitly noted.
Each sector produces one single good. An agent’s share /  of sector’s j,  j  =  p, g, 
production is a function of the amount of labor nj and capital kj devoted to this 
sector. Let
yp =  f ( n p, k”)
y9 =  h(tiB, k9)
be these functions, each being homogeneous of degree one, twice continuously 
differentiable, satisfying3
f i > f i  >  0 ; fy i , f 22 <  0 ; / 12 =  f z i >  0 ; 
hi, h2 >  0 ; ^ ii )  h22 <  0 ; h 12 =  h2i >  0  .
Private goods can be used either for consumption or Capital formation. Public 
goods are pure consumption goods. Therefore the yields of private production 
are the sole source for financing investment. Hence public investment may also 
be regarded as a tax levied on the private sector. Investment of both sectors 
consists of reinvestment (a fixed proportion 8j of the existing Capital stock) and 
of expansion investment. Thus,
ip =  k ”  +  ö pk p 
i9 =  k9 +  ö9k9
define private and public investment, respectively. As a consequence, private 
consumption is restricted to
cp s  yp ~  ip ~  i9 
whereas public consumption obeys
N c 9 ^ N y 9 .
This last equation results from the fact that, once it has been produced, a unit 
of a public good can be consumed jointly by all members of society.
The agent supplies one unit of labor inelastically, so that his labor input must 
satisfy
np +  n9 g, 1 .
His aim is to maximize the discounted Utility of his consumption stream over 
the time interval [0, oo). Utility at time t e  [0, oo) depends on the consumption 
of both types of goods according to
u =  u(cp, N c 9) .
Assume that the instantaneous utility function u is strictly concave, twice con­
tinuously differentiable, satisfying
ul5 u2 >  0 ; un , u22 <  0 ; u 12 =  u21 >  0 .
3 Partial derivatives are denoted by indices and time derivatives by a dot.
Finally, denote by g >  0  the social rate of time preference used in discounting
instantaneous utility.
Now the stage is set to state the agent’s intertemporal choice problem. It
reads °°
m ax J u(cp, N c e) e e‘ dt{cP,cs,nP,ns,iP,i9} o
s.t. kp =  ip — Spkp 
( k9 =  i9 - ö 9k9
0 S f ( n p, kp) -  cp -  ip -  i9
0 ^  h(ns, kg) -  c9
1 ^  np +  nfl 
kp( 0) =  kp
k9(0) =  k%
where the non-negativity conditions are not explicitly stated.
The solution of this optimal control problem will be studied in the next 
section.
3. Optimal Capital Accumulation
Necessary and sufficient conditions for an interior solution to problem (1) are 
given by the following set of equations:4
( f i «  kp) y u2(cp, N c 9)
h 1{ng, k 9) u 1(cp, N c s)
(lb ) 0 = f ( n p, k p) - c p - i p - i 9
(1 c) 0  =  h (ne, k9) — c9
(1 d) 1 =  np +  n9
(le) 4>p =  u 1(cp, N c 9)
(10 iAp =  >l/a
(2a) kp =  ip -  öpkp
(2b) k9 =  i9 -  S9k9
(2c) r  =  (e +  öp - f 2(np, k ”) ) r
(2d) +
(3a) lim e ~ e‘ ip^t) ^  0
\ V j = P , 0 -
(3 b) lim e Qt\jj’ {t) kJ(t) =  0
4 These conditions are derived using the by now familiar methods of optimal control 
theory. See e.g. Ar r o w  and K u r z  [1971], Proposition 7 and 8 on pages 48 -4 9 .
Conditions (1 a ) - ( l  f) are designed to determine the optimal values of the con- 
trol variables cp, c9, np, n9, ip and i9 for given values of the state variables kp and 
k9 and the costate variables <pp and ij/9. These variables change between two 
adjacent points of time according to the equations of motion (2 a )-(2 d ). The 
transversality conditions are given by (3 a) and (3 b).
m2/mj is the agent’s marginal rate of substitution between the consumption of 
private and public goods. f l /h1 is the marginal rate at which public goods can 
be transformed into private goods via a reallocation of labor. At each moment 
of time, capital inputs are predetermined by previous investment decisions. 
Hence condition (1 a) states that the marginal rate of transformation equals the 
sum of the individuals’ marginal rates of substitution. This is the famous 
Samuelson condition for a Pareto efficient allocation in the presence of public 
goods.5 Equations(1 b ) - ( ld )  are market-clearing conditions. Condition (le )  
relates the marginal utility of private consumption to the shadow price of 
private capital. According to (1 f), private and public capital must have the same 
shadow price for all t e  [0, oo).
F o r a further analysis of system (1) it is rewarding to consider next a station- 
ary equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium satisfying =  kj =  0 V/ =  p, g. From  
(2 a) (2 d) together with (1 a) f 1 d) the following set of equations determines the 
stationary values of cp, c9, np, n9, kp and k.9 :
Condition (4 b) and (4 c) concern capital accumulation. (4 b) states that private 
capital must be built up until its marginal product equals its user costs, i.e. 
q +  Sp. Since N u 1/u 1 is the price of public goods in terms of private goods, 
equation (4 c) is the same condition with respect to public capital.
The question to be studied now is whether there is a unique path starting 
at (/cg, k90), that converges to the allocation implied by (4). A look at ( l a ) -  
(1 f) immediately reveals that this is not the case. The five equations (1 a ) - ( l  e) 
are not sufficient to determine the six control variables for given values of kp, 
k9 and ijtp (or ip9). This result is the direct outcome of the fact that both 
private and public capital accumulation are fmanced from the yields of
(4 b)
(4 a)
f i ( n p, kp) n u2(cp, N c9) 
hi (n9, k9) u l (cp, N c 9) 
ß +  ö” =  f 2 (np, kp)
(4 c)
( 4 d )  
(4 e) 
(4f)
0 =  f ( n p, kp) -  cp -  Spkp -  S9k9
0 =  h (n9, k9) — c9
1 =  np +  n9 .
5 C f. S a m u e l s o n  [1 9 5 4 ] .
private production. On an optimal path, public investment contributes at the 
margin as much to individual welfare as does private investment. Consequently, 
the representative agent is indifferent as between these two types of investment.6
The following manipulations yield a more convenient Statement of this result. 
Differentiate the identity (1 f) with respect to time. This yields \j/p =  tj/s. Insert 
from (2c) and (2d) into this equation to obtain
This last equation together with the equations ( l a ) - ( l d ) ,  (2a), (2b) and (3) 
summarizes the conditions for an optimal path. To close the model, assume that 
capital in one sector is accumulated according to
k *J being the stationary value of kj obtained from (4). From  the two possible 
systems (7) and (8),
only (7) is unambiguously locally stable.7 Thus, the transversality conditions 
discriminate between (7) and (8) in favor of (7).
For each given k  and each pair (/cg, k%) in a neighborhood of ( k * p, k * e), 
equations (7) together with the suitable modified equations (1 a ) - ( l  d) and (5) 
define a unique convergent path. Since the model does not determine k, there 
exists an infinity of optimal paths towards the stationary equilibrium.
Viewed from the perspective of social consent, the members of this fictitious 
society agree with respect to the final targets but they may well argue about the 
proper way to approach these targets. Regarded in this way the model incor- 
porates a property which is a kind of stylized fact of Western democratic 
societies, namely the observed (almost) unanimous consent with respect to 
constitutional objectives combined with considerable debate as to the proper 
way of achieving them.
6 If, instead of my assumption, public goods were used for public capital accumulation, 
(1 f) would be replaced by N u 2 =  ipp and the indifference would vanish.
7 The roots of the characteristic equation of (7) are — k  <  0 and Bipldkp — Sp ä  0. The
roots of (8) are — k <  0 and di9/dka — S9 <  0. It is a straightforward exercise to prove
these statements by calculating 8iJl8kJ — SJ, j  =  p ,g  from the suitably modified system of 
equations (1 a ) - ( l  d), (5). Since the formulas are very lengthy, they are not given here.
(5)
(6) kJ =  x ( k — kJ), k  >  0, j  =  p  or g  ,
(7 a) 
(7 b) 
(8 a) 
(8b)
lcp =  K (k *p -  k”) 
k» =  i» -  S9k9 
k<> =  ip -  Spkp
ke =  K{k*g — k9)
The relation between the social rate of time preference and the steady state 
allocation is revealed by a straightforward exercise in comparative-statics. Dif­
ferentiation of (4) with respect to q  and the endogenous variables cp, ce, np, n9, 
kp and k? yields a system of linear equations that can be solved for dz/dp, 
z e  {cp, c9, n p, ne, kp, kg}. A rather tedious calculation yields the following main 
results: 8
(9 a)
(9 b)
(9 c)
d(kp/np
8 q
d{k?/n*
ÖQ
=  (np) 2 A {(fcj h12 ~  h1 h22) [(ßft -  a h j  f l np +  Qkp]
+  (hl h 1 2 - h 2 h l l ) ( ß ö 9 - a h 2) f 1np} < 0
=  (n9) ~ 2 A {(h1f l2 -  h2 f u ) Qßh1 n9
+  (h2f l2 -  h j 22) [ ß h ^ n *  +  ö9k?) -  « M Ä i «9 +  K  k9)]} <  0
d{Ncgjcp)
de
=  N (cp) ~ 2 A ^ > (ß cp +  ctc9) [h\(2 h2 f t2 -  f xh22 -  h j 22) 
-  h K h i f n  + f 1h l l ) +  2 f 1h 1h2 h l2\
+  y / r 1(fc2 c '  +  ^ / 12h12 ( ~ - i
with: a : =  N (u 1u22 — u2u12) <  0 ; ß \ =  — u 2u 11) >  0 ;
y : =  u\ f 2/N  >  0  and
A - =  { - Q ß f J 2iih2h ^2 - -  M n )  (ßög -  « Ä j)  
+  (h2 h1 2 - h l h22) .
Consider an increase in the social rate of time preference, raising the user costs 
of capital. Capital intensity in both sectors of production consequently declines 
as indicated by (9 a) and (9 b). So labor productivity, being a positive function 
of capital intensity, is depressed.9 This induces an income effect, reducing the 
consumption of both types of goods. If the instantaneous Utility function u is
8 ln deriving these formulas I have used (4a)-(4c), ( / , l f 22 — f i 2) =  (hl l h22 — h2l2) 
=  °> f n  =  —/ 2 1  f i 2 =  - f n n plkr, h11 =  — h2l ks/ng, h22 =  -  hl2na/kg (due to the 
linear homogeneity of /  and h) for collecting terms and simplifying expressions.
9 The linear homogeneity of /  and h together with (9 a) and (9 b) implies
8(yplnp) r 8{kp/np) ,  —J 2 <  0 and 5(fc9/n9) <  0 .
homothetic, i.e. u =  Q[N cg a>{cp j N  c9)], £2', m' >  0, ß ", <o" <  0, the income effect 
lowers private and public consumption by the same percentage rate, leaving 
the ratio N c p/cp unaffected. To see this, calculate uj; uu, i , j  =  1, 2 from u =  
Q[Nc9co(cp/N  c9)] and insert the results into (ßcp +  a cg): the expression 
Q(ßcp +  <xcg) [ • ] in (9c) then vanishes. The remaining term y[ • ] is a substi- 
tution effect originating in changing production costs. Since public production 
is less capital intensive than private production, kg/n9 <  kp/np, increasing user 
costs of capital raise the relative price of private goods. Thus private consump­
tion is partly replaced by public consumption. This raises N c 9/cp, i.e. the 
amount of public goods consumed together with each unit of private goods, 
since Ay[ • ] in (9c) is positive if k?/n9 <  kp/np. 10 Due to the fact that the income 
and substitution effects are opposite in direction, it is an open question whether 
an increase of g lowers or raises public consumption in absolute terms. If public 
consumption does not decline, employment in the public sector must be raised 
in order to compensate for the depressed labor productivity.
5. Conclusions
On the preceding pages a model of a mixed economy has been set forth, based 
on the representation of both the private and the public sector as production 
processes of private and public goods, respectively.
From  the perspective of public choice th eory11 an interesting property of this 
model is the indeterminancy of an optimal path of capital accumulation in the 
presence of a well-determined steady state allocation. This is founded in the 
assumption that both private and public capital accumulation are financed 
from the yields of private production. In democratic, market-oriented societies, 
individuals attain welfare gains by effort devoted to both private and public 
affairs. Thus, on a more general level the conclusion derived may yield one 
explanation of the fact that in Western industrial societies (almost) unanimous 
consent with respect to constitutional objectives can be achieved but not about 
the proper ways to achieve them.
The assumption that private production is more capital intensive than public 
production together with the assumption of a homothetic instantaneous utility 
function of the representative decision maker implies a positive relation be­
tween public consumption, measured in units of public goods per unit of private 
goods, and the social rate of time preference. Combined with the hypotheses 
that time preference is positively related to per capita incom e12 this result 
contributes to the already vast literature on the growth of governm ent13, for
10 This is a special case of the well known Rybczynski-Theorem. Cf. R y b c z y n s k i  
[1955).
11 See e.g. B u c h a n a n  and T o l l is io n  [1972], [1984], M u e l l e r  [1979].
12 Cf. U z a w a  [1968]. In N e u m a n n  [1985] this hypotheses is used to explain long 
swings in econom ic development.
13 See e.g. th e  survey of L a rk e y , S to lp  and W in e r  [1981].
it predicts that in the course of growing per capita income, time preference 
increases and thus reduces private in favor of public consumption. This happens 
not as a result of shifting preferences between private and public consumption 
but because of changing relative prices. M ore generally speaking, the higher the 
social rate of time preference, the more emphasis is put on political issues than 
on market forces, because welfare gains from private markets are more difficult 
to accomplish than those arising from political decision-making when time 
preference and thus the user costs of capital are high.
Finally some possible extensions of the model may be hinted at. It would be 
desirable to include the production of capital goods in the public sector and the 
possible welfare losses brought about by the disincentives of a growing tax 
burden as well as by public regulation. Furtherm ore, this model should be 
extended in order to cover technical progress. Whether these extensions would 
considerably change the results obtained in this paper is a question left open for 
further research.
Summary
This paper provides a set of sufficient conditions for a positive relation between 
the social rate of time preference and a suitable measure of public consumption. 
The model within which this relation is established allows for infinitely many 
paths towards a well determined steady state allocation. Thus, from a public 
choice perspective, the members of the model’s society may dispute the proper 
path but not the steady state allocation. The paper is based on the modelling 
of both the private and the public sector of a mixed economy as production 
processes of private and public goods, respectively, the former being more 
capital intensive than the latter. It is this assumption together with the assump- 
tion of a homothetic instantaneous utility function of the representative deci- 
sion maker that accounts for the positive relation between time preference and 
public consumption in a steady state.
Z  usammenfassung 
Öffentlicher Verbrauch, optimale Kapitalakkumulation 
und gesellschaftliche Zeitpräferenzrate
In diesem Beitrag werden hinreichende Bedingungen dafür abgeleitet, daß ein 
Anstieg der gesellschaftlichen Zeitpräferenz den Staatskonsum erhöht. Das 
hierfür entwickelte Modell vermag zwar die stationäre Allokation festzulegen, 
läßt jedoch Wahlfreiheit bezüglich des Akkumulationspfades. Demgemäß mag 
in der beschriebenen Gesellschaft zwar Streit um die Wahl des Pfades, jedoch 
nicht bezüglich des gewünschten Endzustandes ausbrechen. Das Modell beruht 
darauf, eine duale Wirtschaftsordnung in Form  zweier Produktionsprozesse für 
private bzw. öffentliche Güter darzustellen. Angenommen wird, die Produktion 
privater Güter sei kapitalintensiver als die öffentlicher Güter. Zusammen mit
der Annahme, die Nutzenfunktion des repräsentativen Individuums sei homo- 
thetisch, folgt daraus, daß der staatliche Konsum im stationären Gleichgewicht 
positiv mit der Zeitpräferenzrate verbunden ist.
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